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1. As part of his celebrated attack on the “Myth of the 
Given” Wilfrid Sellars argues for a radical alternative to the 
orthodox, neo-Cartesian conception of our knowledge of 
our own minds – self-knowledge, for short (Sellars 1997; 
unless otherwise indicated all references are to this work). 
The orthodox conception finds a particularly elaborate 
expression in traditional empiricism. On this conception, it 
is with our own mental states that we hold the most 
intimate and direct epistemic relation. Therefore, self-
knowledge is a paradigm, indeed the paradigm, of non-
inferential and non-theoretical knowledge. In contrast, 
Sellars claims that self-knowledge is akin to theoretical 
knowledge in science. Indeed, in his view self-knowledge 
illustrates the continuity of science with ordinary thinking 
(97). At the same time he takes self-knowledge to illustrate 
the fact that the distinction between the theoretical and the 
non-theoretical is merely methodological (84). These 
general points are made fairly clearly by Sellars. However, 
the argument that he offers on their behalf is rather 
obscure. The main purpose of this paper is to provide a 
clear reconstruction of Sellars' argument. But I shall also 
provide a brief diagnosis of a crucial weakness in the 
argument due to which it is, ultimately, unsuccessful. 
2. Descartes, famously, considers awareness to be of 
necessity discursive i.e., concept involving: an awareness 
of something as something. In his view non-discursive 
beings that lack conceptual capacities must be mere 
automatons devoid of mental states (Kenny 1981, 243-5). 
In contrast, although their conception of the mind is in 
crucial respects Cartesian, traditional empiricists are 
committed to the possibility of a non-discursive awareness, 
i.e. one that does not involve concepts. Indeed, according 
to traditional empiricism discursive awareness rests on 
non-discursive awareness in two respects. First, episodes 
of non-discursive awareness are our basic means for 
forming and grasping concepts. Second, episodes of non-
discursive awareness by which we acquire concepts 
warrant the application of these concepts in episodes of 
discursive awareness - viz. basic, non-inferential empirical 
beliefs - on which all other empirical justifications rest. I 
shall call the first thesis non-discursive formationism, and 
the second thesis non-discursive foundationalism. 
A line of thought that has been taken to support non-
discursive foundationalism is the following. If beliefs could 
be justified only by beliefs then either justification would be 
viciously circular or it would involve infinite regress. But the 
only episodes of discursive awareness that may justify 
beliefs are beliefs. Thus, for justification to be free of either 
vicious circularity or infinite regress it must rest in the last 
analysis on episodes of non-discursive awareness. This is 
particularly true of empirical justification in which case the 
most natural candidates for such justificatory episodes are 
non-discursive bits of experience. (Cf., Bonjour 1985, 
chap. 2 for much further elaboration of these considera-
tions.) 
Another line of thought that has been taken to support 
non-discursive foundationalism is the following (McDowell 
1996, 3-7). Unless exercises of empirical concepts are 
rationally constrained from outside the conceptual sphere 
they cannot be considered as reaching beyond this 
sphere. They must be considered as “moves in a self 
contained game”, a mere “play of empty forms”, “a friction-
less spinning in a void”. The conceptual sphere may be 
thus constrained, it appears, only if non-discursive bits of 
experience constitute the ground level of empirical justifi-
cation. But if so, non-discursive foundationalism is entailed 
by the very possibility of intentionality. 
At this point the question arises of how episodes of non-
discursive awareness can fulfill the role of “the tortoise on 
which stands the elephant on which rests the edifice of 
empirical [justification and] knowledge” (73). The answer 
suggested by traditional empiricism is based on non-
discursive formationism. On this thesis, to be a bit more 
specific than above, classifications by way of non-discur-
sive awareness of similarities and dissimilarities provide 
the basis for ostensive definitions that set up rules for the 
use of the terms applied in our empirical statements. 
According to traditional empiricism the basic beliefs on 
which all our other empirical beliefs supposedly rest are 
true “as a matter of …following [these] rules for … use” 
(72, 77). As such these beliefs resemble analytic state-
ments, though the latter are true as a matter of following 
rules for use set up by linguistic definitions – i.e. definitions 
of linguistic expressions in terms of other linguistic 
expressions. So “in spite of the … differences between 
[basic beliefs] and “analytic statements”, there is an 
essential similarity, [according to traditional empiricism,] 
between the ways in which they come by their authority” 
(71-2). 
The considerations underlying non-discursive founda-
tionalism explain in part the fundamental empiricist thesis 
that empirical justification and knowledge originate in 
experience. The account of the epistemic authority of ex-
perience in terms of non-discursive formationism explains 
in part another fundamental empiricist thesis – viz. that our 
concepts originate in experience. So the foregoing expo-
sition has also unveiled a deep connection between these 
two fundamental theses.  
Non-discursive formationism and non-discursive founda-
tionalism are most familiar with respect to beliefs about the 
world around us. But they are also supposed to apply to 
beliefs about our own mental states. According to 
traditional empiricism these beliefs are basic beliefs 
grounded in episodes of non-discursive awareness. More-
over, traditional empiricism takes it that some beliefs about 
our own mental states – viz. beliefs about how things look 
or appear – are epistemically prior to beliefs about how 
things are in the world (32-46 passim). So the view that our 
access to our own mental states is the most immediate is 
part and parcel of traditional empiricism.  
Non-discursive formationism and non-discursive founda-
tionalism constitute the crux of what Sellars calls “The 
Myth of the Given”. His radical alternative to the orthodox 
conception of self-knowledge stems from his subtle and 
rich attack on these theses and their implications. It is to 
relevant aspects of this attack that I shall now turn. 
3. Anything with stable dispositions to respond differen-
tially to stimuli can be thought of as classifying the stimuli 
according to the repeatable responses those stimuli elicit. 
This is true of a thermostat that responds differentially to 
the temperature in its vicinity. And it is also true of the 
honeybee that responds differentially to the location and 
quality of the food it encounters on a foraging trip. 




However, a classification by differential response is not yet 
a discursive classification by way of concepts. In order to 
count as discursive a classification must have three closely 
related features that take it far beyond a mere differential 
response. First, the classification must enjoy an appropri-
ate distance, to use McDowell’s term, from the direct 
causal influence of the items classified (McDowell 1996, 
57). It must not be a mere stimulus-response process. To 
achieve such a distance the classification must, secondly, 
take up a position in “the logical space of reasons, of 
justifying and being able to justify” (40-1, 73-77). By being 
sensitive to the reasons relevant to a given classification 
the classifier may classify an item differently from how the 
direct causal influence of the item disposes her. Finally, 
the classification must involve language, indeed be a 
“linguistic affair” (62-64). For the inferential relations that 
characterize the logical space of reasons may obtain only 
between linguistic entities. 
Classifications by mere differential response belong to 
the non-normative logical space of (causal) law. As such 
they cannot yield classifications that belong to the 
normative logical space of reasons. This means that for 
the classificatory processes assumed by the thesis of non-
discursive formationism to yield concepts and language, 
these processes must involve concepts and therefore 
language. As Sellars puts it, “all awareness of sorts, 
resemblances, facts etc., in short, all awareness of 
abstract entities – indeed, all awareness even of particu-
lars – is a linguistic affair” (63). But then the thesis of non-
discursive formationism is incoherent. For its gist is that 
the concepts yielding processes it assumes are wholly pre-
conceptual and pre-linguistic. Due to the close ties 
between non-discursive formationism and non-discursive 
foundationalism, the incoherence of the former thesis also 
reflects on the latter thesis. But I cannot go into this 
important point here. 
4. The acquisition of concepts requires, then, a prior 
possession of concepts and language. This raises the 
question of how concepts can be acquired at all. Aware in 
part of this problem, traditional rationalists took it that at 
least some of our concepts, the most basic and general 
ones, are not acquired but innate. In the innateness 
debate, however, Sellars sides with the empiricists and 
assumes that all concepts are acquired (20-21). Given this 
assumption the processes by which we acquire concepts 
cannot involve concepts that we already own. These pro-
cesses must therefore involve concepts that others own. 
They must consist of a training through “publicly reinforced 
responses to public [things] … in public situations” by 
others who already possess concepts (86-7).  
Obviously, mental concepts that are acquired by such a 
training must be “introduced in terms of a basic vocabulary 
pertaining to overt behavior” (100). This behaviorist 
conclusion – methodological behaviorism, as Sellars calls 
it (98) – may appear to involve a commitment to analytical 
or philosophical behaviorism – namely, the view that all 
proper mental concepts should be definable in terms of 
overt behavior. If this is indeed the case we would lose our 
grip on the idea of mental states as inner episodes – i.e. 
episodes that do not consist of overt behavior, and that are 
private in that each of us has a privileged access to her 
own. However, methodological behaviorism does not entail 
analytical behaviorism. This is so since “the behavioristic 
requirement that all concepts should be introduced in 
terms of a basic vocabulary pertaining to overt behavior is 
compatible with the idea that some behavioristic concepts 
are to be introduced as theoretical concepts” (100). In 
other words, even if all mental concepts should be 
introduced by reference to overt behavior, they need not 
all refer directly to overt behavior. Some may thus refer 
only indirectly by referring directly to non-behavioral 
features that must be inferred in order to explain overt 
behavior. 
It follows that the only way to retain the idea of mental 
states as inner, non-behavioral episodes is to consider 
these states as theoretical entities. Contra the positivistic 
conception of science, this does not mean that mental 
states qua inner episodes should be considered as of less 
authenticity than directly observable items, as useful 
fictions or as mere heuristic devices (83-4). But it implies a 
radical reorientation of the orthodox conception of self-
knowledge, a reorientation that renders this type of 
knowledge akin to scientific knowledge. As such this 
reorientation illustrates the continuity of scientific and pre-
scientific thinking. It illustrates, in other words, the fact that 
“the process of devising “theoretical” explanations of 
observable phenomena did not spring full-blown from the 
head of modern science” (96), but is “the flowering of a 
dimension of discourse which already exists in what 
historians call the ‘prescientific stage’ “ (81).  
5. If mental states are theoretical entities they must be 
intersubjective in that there is no difference between third 
and first person access to them. But doesn’t this mean that 
if mental states are theoretical entities we lose our grip on 
the idea that they are private in that each of us has a 
privileged access to her own? If “privacy” here means 
“absolute privacy” – i.e. a privileged access that is 
independent of context – then the intersubjectivity of our 
mental states does indeed entail that they are not private 
(107). However, there is a weaker sense of privacy, which 
is compatible with intersubjectivity; indeed, privacy in this 
sense presupposes intersubjectivity. Thus, people who 
have been taught a theory that applies to their behavior 
“can be trained to give reasonably reliable self-descrip-
tions, using the language of the theory, without having to 
observe [their own] overt behavior. [This may be brought] 
about, roughly, by applauding utterances by [the trainee] of 
[e.g.] 'I am thinking that p' when the behavioral evidence 
strongly supports the theoretical statement '[The trainee] is 
thinking that p'; and by frowning on utterances of [e.g.] 'I 
am thinking that p' when the evidence does not support 
this theoretical statement” (106-7). But once one has been 
trained in this way one has gained a sort of privileged 
access to one’s mental states. One may then reliably 
report on one’s mental states without relying on any 
behavioral evidence, while others cannot do this. “What 
began as a language with a purely theoretical use has 
gained a reporting role” (107). 
This illustrates a general point about theoretical con-
cepts (79-85; Brandom 1997, 162-166). According to 
Sellars purely theoretical concepts are ones we can be 
entitled to apply only as the conclusions of inferences, 
whereas concepts of observables also have non-inferen-
tial, reporting uses. Given these definitions, the line 
between the theoretical and the observable may shift with 
time or with the right training. Thus, Pluto was introduced 
as a purely theoretical object. But the development of 
more powerful telescopes eventually made it a subject of 
non-inferential reports. Similarly, physicists with the right 
training can non-inferentially report the presence of mu 
mesons in bubble chambers. So “the distinction between 
theoretical and non-theoretical discourse [is methodologi-
cal rather than] substantive” (84) .  
The notion of observation underlying the orthodox 
account of self-knowledge is that of direct perceptual or 
introspective acquaintance. Obviously, this notion is very 
different from the notion of observation underlying Sellars’ 




conception of self-knowledge – viz. non-inferential report-
ting, which is made possible by a training akin to con-
ditioning. In particular, unlike observational concepts in the 
former, orthodox sense, those in the latter, Sellarsian 
sense “are primarily and essentially intersubjective, … and 
[their] reporting role … constitutes a dimension of [their] 
use which is built on and presupposes this intersubjective 
status” (107). So although Sellars takes mental concepts 
to shift status from the theoretical to the observational, this 
does not narrow the wide gulf between his account of self-
knowledge and the orthodox account.  
6. Sellars’ conception of self-knowledge is principally 
based, then, on a rejection of a fundamental assumption of 
the empiricist conception – namely, that concept acquisition 
is based on non-discursive and non-linguistic processes. 
As against this assumption Sellars argues that the 
acquisition of concepts must be a discursive-cum-linguistic 
affair. From this he draws the conclusion that concept 
acquisition must be a communal affair – i.e. that we can 
only acquire concepts by way of training by other subjects 
of awareness who already possess concepts. Mental 
concepts acquired in this way must refer first and foremost 
to overt behavior. So to avoid philosophical behaviorism 
Sellars concludes that our concepts of mental states qua 
inner episodes distinct from overt behavior must be 
theoretical concepts that refer to overt behavior indirectly. 
Sellars’ crucial step in this ingenious argument - his 
claim that concept acquisition must be a discursive-cum-
linguistic affair - seems correct, or at least I shall grant him 
this claim. All this claim entails, however, is that the 
acquisition of concepts must involve the prior possession 
of some concepts, perhaps the most basic and most 
general ones. On this basis Sellars may conclude at most 
that the acquisition of the latter concepts must be a 
communal affair. But this conclusion is compatible with the 
possibility that the acquisition of all other concepts is not a 
communal affair. In particular, insofar as Sellars’ argument 
is concerned the acquisition of basic concepts such as that 
of property, identity, similarity etc. by way of communal 
training may enable one to construct mental concepts in a 
non-communal manner – e.g. by way of introspecting 
similarities between one’s inner episodes in a discursive 
manner that involves the basic concepts. This very brief 
diagnosis of a crucial weakness in Sellars' argument 
requires further elaboration. But it suffices to show, I be-
lieve, that this argument is, ultimately, unsuccessful. The 
demise of the Myth of the Given does not entail that self-
knowledge is akin to scientific knowledge. 
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